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Many Mornings After 1. CLAMOR FOR A BIG MOVE

President Kennedy is under mounting pressure to undertake desperate measures to retrieve the Cuban debacle. There is clamor for a new, heavier offensive against Castro, based on the same fantasies that led to last week's misfortune.



Many Americans understandably feel a sense of frustration, and Mr. Khrushchev cannot even be called a good winner; his taunts seem almost calculated to incite a punitive expedition. Many men who were the architects of our disaster—and there were many—understandably seek some spectacular coup that would erase their blunders from public memory.

But no such formula exists. Those who would stampede the President into impulsive reprisal are in fact proposing that he compound their errors.

Not everything is plain about what went wrong in Cuba. Some things are.

The CIA was wrong in its estimate of Cuba's readiness for revolt. The Pentagon was wrong in its estimate of the military potentialities. The State Department was

wrong in its estimate of the political risks involved in an exercise that jeopardized all our recent progress at the United Nations and in our dealings with neutralist nations.

2. POLITICS AND GAMESMANSHIP

The fundamental misjudgment common to all of these groups was political. The CIA's hostility to the progressive elements in the Cuban exile movement was documented by William V. Shannon in this newspaper yesterday. The Pentagon has never grasped the altered nature of a world struggle in which the machinery of a police state transforms all the old laws of logistics. Saddest of all, the State Department meemed crudely unresponsive to the derision a free society invites when it tires to lead a double life and becomes the preacher caught in the act of sin.

Castros Cuba is not primarily a military threat to America. In the age of rockets, Mr. K needs no such proximity if and when he goes mad. What is a matter of valid concern is the use of Cuba as a source 🚮 arms for Latin American antidemocratic movements, as the rallyingground in Communist guerrillas, as a threat to with American peace.

But this challenge is not a matter of hours. All these are issues that could still be properly placed before the United Nations and 🖎 Organization of American States; it has to be late to do so. Will we mee Approved For Release 2000/04/13: CIA-RDP70 00058 Re002001401922 doubtedly. The we accompanied such day and night that we are stored action with the insistent call for free elec-

gists and activists will say such moves will avail us nothing today or tomorrow. But the tough guys have had their chance, and some very noble men died in their ignoble experiment. It is time to remind ourselves that ideas are weapons, no matter how much scorned by the cloak-anddagger boys and the drumbeaters.

The central fact remains that even a successful military thrust against Castro would be a doomed adventure unless it touched off a great popular rising. There is no real sign that Cuba has been awaiting such a signal. To organize a new affort to do what we failed to do last treek would be to proclaim that we learn nighting from history. Whether we like M or not, the Castro mystique bulwarked by the firing squad-remains powers; it must be fought on far different Wrain than the ground that CIA chose.

It must be fought within the coingils of the UN. It must be fought with a langer program of economic aid to Latin Analy ica than we have so far contemplated fand with stronger insistence that such eld become the basis for social and exchanic reform.

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